Jean Tirole, professor at the University of Social Sciences of Toulouse, was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics. The Nobel Committee website says that the French economist received the prize for his analysis of “market power” and its regulation.
Tirol studied the regulation of a market when there are several strong competitive players. An analysis of market power conducted by a French scientist made it possible to clarify the equilibrium conditions for multi-parameter systems, as well as to identify destructive and productive trends in the existence of firms. Tirol explored the regulatory role of the state in such a situation.
Jean Tirole's book "Markets and Market Power: The Theory of Industrial Organization" was published by the St. Petersburg publishing house "Economic School" in 2000. Here is the annotation for it:
"The book is one of the best modern advanced textbooks on the theory of industrial organization. The first part, “The Theory of the Firm,” discusses various approaches to the concept of the firm and the profit maximization hypothesis. The second part, “Monopoly Behavior,” examines in detail the behavior of the firm in conditions of monopoly, including problems of price behavior; product selection, quality and advertising: price discrimination and vertical control. The third part, “Strategic interaction,” is devoted to the strategic behavior of a company in an oligopoly, namely: the study of static and dynamic price competition, analysis of differentiation problems. products, providing entry into the market and exiting it; strategic aspects of information; research, development and development of new technologies. The book makes extensive use of the mathematical theory of optimization and the theory of non-cooperative games. The book is intended for undergraduate students. researchers, teachers and graduate students specializing in the field economic theory, market research, antitrust policy, and the application of mathematical methods in economic theory."
Tirol also conducts research in the fields of game theory, industrial market theory, and financial theory. His main works are “Dynamic Models of Oligopolies”, “Game Theory”, “Theory of Corporate Finance”. Tyrol contributed to many areas of microeconomic analysis. One of his most famous works is theories of collective reputations. This theory formalizes and describes in the form mathematical model concepts such as reputation, quality (of goods, services), honest behavior. Many new works by other authors on similar topics, in particular, corruption in society, are based on the concept proposed by Tirol.
"U large companies in oligopolistic markets it is possible to manipulate consumers, close entry to the market for “newcomers,” set non-market prices, and distort information. But, at the same time, they have a more advanced structure, technology, and they can also provide better product quality. Research that helps identify effective and ineffective monopolies and oligopolies is very important, comments Maria Evnevich, associate professor Faculty of Economics St. Petersburg State University. - Works that propose methods for regulating such markets in order to improve the climate for doing business, maximizing public utility, and improving production are of great importance. The main thing is that the methods prove to be effective and that there is the will to use them in economic policy.”
Jean Tirol was a contender for the Nobel Prize last year. , which runs the annual sweepstakes, named him the second most likely contender after Harvard University's Robert Barro. As a result, the award was received by Eugene Fama, who took third place in the NES betting.
Unlike the Nobel Prizes in other categories, which are financed by the Alfred Nobel Legacy Fund, the Nobel Prize in Economics is paid by the Swedish Central Bank. The winner will receive 8 million Swedish kronor (about $1.1 million).
In 2013, Lars Peter Hansen and Eugene Fama won the Nobel Prize in Economics for their “empirical analysis of asset prices,” which makes it possible to predict stock prices over the long term.
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The book is one of the best modern advanced textbooks on theory imperfect competition. The apparatus of the theory of non-cooperative games is widely used. Includes Game Theory User's Guide.
INTRODUCTION WHY IS IT NECESSARY TO DO INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION? Theory and reality of the border of the book How to use the book General structure of the book Definition of the market, private balance, the criterion of well -being Private balance, the descending curve of demand, the excess consumer What is the market? THEORY OF THE FIRM 0.1.1. THE FIRM AS A LOOPHOLE FOR EXERCISING MONOPOLY POWER 0.1.2. FIRM AS STATIC SYNERGY 0. 1.3. THE FIRM AS A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP Conclusion of a contract EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 0.1.4. FIRM AS AN INCOMPLETE CONTRACT SCALE OF POWER EMPIRICAL RESEARCH REPUTATION AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR CONTRACTS OR INTEGRATION DOUBLE SUPPLY AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR CONTRACTS 0.2. PROFIT MAXIMIZATION HYPOTHESIS 0.2.1. CORE INCENTIVE PROBLEM OBSERVABILITY, VERIFICABILITY AND POWER AND LIMITED PUNISHMENT AND MANAGER RENT BENCHMARK COMPETITION GRAB MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES: A DYNAMIC PERSPECTIVE OBSERVATION COMPETITION IN THE FOOD MARKET APPLICATION: M-FORM FIRM 0.2.3. DOUBTS ABOUT NEO-CLASSICAL METHODOLOGY COMMUNICATION AND KNOWLEDGE ORGANIZATION DYNAMICS 0.2.4. PROFIT MAXIMIZATION HYPOTHESIS AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 0. 3. ADDITIONAL SECTION. PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONS manifestation of monopoly power Chapter 1 MONOPOLY 1.1. PRICE BEHAVIOR 1.1.1. SINGLE PRODUCT MONOPOLY 1.1.2. MULTIPRODUCT MONOPOLY 1.1.3. MONOPOLY PRODUCING DURABLE GOODS 1.1.4. IDENTIFYING THE DEMAND CURVE 1.1.5. RESERVES 1.2. COST DISTORTIONS 1.3. RENT SEEKING BEHAVIOR 1.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 1.5. ADDITIONAL SECTION. DURABLE GOODS AND THE LIMITS OF MONOPOLY POWER APPENDIX HEURISTIC PROOF OF THE COASE HYPOTHESIS Chapter 2 PRODUCT SELECTION, QUALITY AND ADVERTISING 2.1. THE CONCEPT OF PRODUCT SPACE 2.1.2. HORIZONTAL DIFFERENTIATION 2.1.3. PRODUCT-CHARACTERISTICS APPROACH 2.3, 2.1.4. TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO CONSUMER THEORY 2.2. SELECTION OF PRODUCTS 2.3. QUALITY AND INFORMATION 2.3.1. SINGLE RELATIONSHIPS: MORAL HAZARD AND LEMONS 2.3.2. REPEAT PURCHASES 2.3.3. QUALITY, INFORMATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 2.4. ADVERTISING 2.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 2.6. ADDITIONAL SECTION. REPEAT PURCHASES 2.6.1. REPEATED PURCHASES IN THE ABSENCE OF MORAL HAZARD 2.6.2. REGULATED QUALITY AND REPUTATION Chapter 3 PRICE DISCRIMINATION 3.2. MULTI-MARKET (THIRD DEGREE) PRICE DISCRIMINATION 3.3. PERSONAL ARBITRATION AND SCREENING (SECOND DEGREE PRICE DISCRIMINATION) 3.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 3.5. ADDITIONAL SECTION. NONLINEAR PRICING Chapter 4 VERTICAL CONTROL 4. 1. LINEAR PRICES OR VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS 4.2. EXTERNAL EFFECTS AND VERTICAL CONTROL 4.3. COMPETITION WITHIN THE BRAND 4.3.1. COMPETITION WITHIN BRANDS AND RETAIL SERVICES 4.3.2. HORIZONTAL EXTERNAL EFFECT 4.3.3. DIFFERENTIATED RETAILERS 4.3.4. COMPETITION IN RETAIL TRADE AS A STIMULATIVE 4.3.5. CARTEL OF INTERMEDIARIES 4.4.2. VERTICAL CONSTRAINTS AND PRIOR STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR 4.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 4.6. ADDITIONAL SECTION. RESTRICTIONS THAT REDUCE COMPETITION 4.6.1. COMPETITION IN RETAIL TRADE AS A METHOD OF ACHIEVEMENT OF EFFICIENCY 4.6.2. RESTRICTION OF ACCESS TO MARKET 4.6.2.1. GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR RESTRICTIONS OF MARKET ACCESS 4.6.2.2. CONTRACTS AS BARRIERS TO ENTRY INTO THE INDUSTRY strategic interaction PRICE AND NON-PRICE COMPETITION NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR RESPONSE FUNCTION: STRATEGIC ADDITIONERS AND SUBSTITUTES Chapter 5 PRICE COMPETITION IN THE SHORT PERIOD E 5.2. SOLUTIONS TO BERTRAND'S PARADOX: INTRODUCTION 5.2.1. EDGEWORTH'S SOLUTION 5.2.2. TIME ASPECT 5.2.3. PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 5.2.4. HOW TO ACT ACCORDING TO BERTRAND ANALYSIS 5.3. Diminishing returns to scale and power limitations 5.3.2. PRICE COMPETITION 5.3.3. EX ANTE INVESTMENT AND EX POST PRICE COMPETITION DISCUSSION 5.4. TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS OF COURNEAU CONCENTRATION INDICES AND PROFITABILITY OF THE INDUSTRY 5.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 5.7. ADDITIONAL SECTION. QUANTITATIVE COMPETITION DYNAMIC PRICE COMPETITION AND SECRET COLLUSION 6.1. COMMON VIEWS. (FACTORS FACILITATING AND HINDERING CONSPIRACY) 6.1.2. ASYMMETRY DETECTION LAG OTHER FACTORS 6.2. STATIC APPROACHES TO DYNAMIC PRICE COMPETITION 6.2.1. SPECIAL VARIATIONS DISCUSSION OF THE SUPER GAME 6.3.1. APPLICATIONS SECRET PRICE REDUCTION PRICE RIGIDITY REPUTATION FOR FRIENDLY BEHAVIOR CONCLUDING REMARKS 6.4. ADDITIONAL SECTION. DYNAMIC GAMES AND SECRET COLLUSION SECRET PRICE REDUCTIONS PRICE RIGIDITY AND LONG DEMAND CURVE PEOPLE'S THEOREMS DIFFERENTIATION OF PRODUCTS: PRICE AND NON-PRICE COMPETITION SPATIAL COMPETITION CIRCULAR CITY 7.1.2.1. MAXIMUM OR MINIMUM DIFFERENTIATION? MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION ADVERTISING AND INFORMATIONAL DIFFERENTIATION OF PRODUCTS VIEWS ON ADVERTISING 7.3.2. PRODUCTS TESTED: INFORMATION DIFFERENTIATION AND GOOD NAME CONCLUDING REMARKS ADDITIONAL SECTION. SYMMETRICAL MODEL OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION Chapter 8 INPUT, ITS DELIVERY AND EXIT 8.1. FIXED COSTS: NATURAL MONOPOLY AND COMPETITIVENESS STRUGGLE OF DHALETION ABSORBED COSTS AND BARRIERS TO ENTRY: STACKELBERG-SPENCE-DIXIT MODEL DISCUSSION AND DISTRIBUTION CLASSIFICATION OF BUSINESS STRATEGIES 8. 4. APPLICATIONS OF CLASSIFICATION 8.5. EPILOGUE: PRICES COMPARED TO QUANTITIES ADDITIONAL SECTION. STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND BARRIERS TO ENTRY OR MOBILITY INFORMATION AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR: REPUTATION, PRICING LIMITS, PREDATION 9.1. STATIC COMPETITION WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 9.2. DYNAMICS: HEURISTIC APPROACH 9.3. GRANTION OF ENTRY AND COLLUSION 9.4. MILGROM-ROBERTS CONSTRAINT PRICING MODEL 9.5. MERGER PREDATION 9.6. REPUTATION IN THE CASE OF SEVERAL MARKETS 9.7. HISTORY OF THE “LONG SCARY” 9.8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 9.9. ADDITIONAL SECTION. DARWIN SELECTION IN THE INDUSTRY OF RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 10.1. INCENTIVES AS A FUNCTION OF MARKET STRUCTURE: THE VALUE OF INNOVATION INTRODUCTION TO PATENT RACES 10.2. ANALYSIS OF PATENT PROTECTION FROM A WELFARE PERSPECTIVE 10.3. ALTERNATIVE INCENTIVES FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 10.4. STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 10.5. INNOVATION PREVENTING FROM IMITATION: ADVANCE AND DIFFUSION 10.6. NETWORK EXTERNALITY, STANDARDIZATION AND COMPATIBILITY DEMAND SIDE: COORDINATION OF USER EXPECTATIONS SUPPLY SIDE: SPONSORSHIP AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR 10.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 10.8. ADDITIONAL SECTION. PATENT LICENSING AND COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH STRUCTURES Chapter 11 NON-COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: USER'S GUIDE 11.1. GAMES AND STRATEGIES NASH EQUILIBRIUM 11.2. PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM 11.3. PERFECT BAYES EQUILIBRIUM 11.4. BAYES EQUILIBRIUM 11. 5. DISTORTING SIGNALS 11.6. ADDITIONAL SECTION LITERATURE
